Peers against the people
A constitutional reform that could win a Welsh - and British - thumbs up
WHY is it that amid all the recent discussion of constitutional change, in which most institutions’ practices and powers have fallen under the spotlight, one has seldom been questioned? Why, when accountability is front and centre in the public’s concerns about their representatives, has the least accountable of our institutions escaped scrutiny? And why in these frugal times, where barely a week goes by without ideas to trim the bloated state, has no-one mentioned an utterly obvious way of doing exactly that?
The Conservatives say that, if elected, they will cut back the number of MPs, especially in post-devolution Wales. Lord Ellis-Thomas recently called for the post of Secretary of State for Wales to be scrapped. Others seek to wish away our 60 Assembly Members, harking back to what they obviously see as the good old days of centralism.
Each argument is deeply flawed. And each misses the juicy target sitting under the nose of any would-be constitutional reformer. The House of Lords represents an affront to anyone who is serious about democratic government, and anyone who aspires to lean governance. Those who do bring their Lordships into the discussion inevitably focus on the democratisation of the second chamber. Others, perhaps, just don’t see what it does as relevant. In either case, this oversight is unfortunate.
The abolition of the House of Lords would save more money than a small cutback in the number of MPs, and would enhance rather than cost democratic representation. It is a case that should attract any democratic socialist. And, in a happy marriage of principle and popularity, a properly espoused case would resonate with the public.
Quite apart from the cost savings, abolition would be a welcome symbol of modernism and democracy. The famous defence that such things are not spoken of on that mythical doorstep is not a reason not to change. It is a function, at least in part, of a failure to do so. Apathy is what happens when an unelected house is still able to prevaricate, block and delay legislation voted through by elected MPs on such matters as fox hunting debacle, or reform the House of Lords itself.
These are just two examples plucked from many. And they stand despite the progress has been made since 1997, with the abolition of the abhorrent hereditary principle. It is clear that we must go further. The House of Lords still symbolises outdated privilege and is a reactionary block on progress towards social justice. It is long past its sell-by date. So, there are two options – either change the Lords or abolish it. Many capable, respected and genuine colleagues have argued for years that further reform is the answer, and that the Lords and be dragged into something approaching the 21st century.
But for what purpose? What would a fully elected House of Lords add to our system? Would it not run the considerable danger of merely replicating the ‘lower’ House? What is more, armed with a more powerful mandate, it would almost certainly see fit to challenge the view of the Commons more often. The result? Wrangling and inertia, those great friends of conservatism and opponents of progress. Just ask those trying to get much needed progressive health reform passed in the US about how an elected upper House can cause delay and threaten to water down vital and overdue measures.
The method of electing Lords would also raise its own issues. Closed lists elected on the basis of proportional representation is the most commonly suggested system. But would this really create a desirable upper House, or give the public much choice about who represents them? Our own experience of closed lists in Wales has hardly been encouraging.
So while the House of Lords as it stands is unfit for purpose, a reformed Lords may well present its own problems. Added to the current pressure on public finances, the arguments for abolition are compelling.
Putting nothing in place of an upper House is not an option. A unicameral system would necessitate a strengthened House of Commons and an overhauled system of Committees. Powerful Commons Committees, freely selected by Members of Parliament, could be given the power to interrogate Ministers, hold the Government to account and hold debates on the floor of the Commons.
When investigating a subject or scrutinising a Bill, Members of that Committee could elect outside experts with previous experience in the relevant field to assist with their investigations. If they were scrutinising a Defence Bill or looking into a defence policy, for example, they could agree to enlist former military experts, including former Ministers and MPs with experience in that area. They would have unprecedented access to the information, civil servants and politicians and their reports would be given real weight and power.
Defenders of the Lords argue that the upper House gives our lawmakers time to think again about legislation and reconsider when necessary, resulting in better law. This is a valid point, although one that is far too often used as a cover by reactionaries opposing change. Certainly, there should be checks in place to improve legislation and prevent bad laws being rushed through on tide of crises and transient media pressure.
But these checks should be in the hands of democratically elected MPs. Give Commons Committees the power to make the Government think again, not unelected conservative Peers who revel in being a roadblock to progress – or a detached upper House looking to make its mark and hold back the will of the Commons.
These changes to the Commons would have the added benefit of advancing the role of the backbench MP. All too often in recent times, the role of a backbench MP has been reduced to being a mere step on the ladder towards a Ministerial career. But it doesn’t have to be like that. It certainly wasn’t for Welsh MPs like Leo Abse, or for Gwyneth Dunwoody, another Parliamentarian with Welsh links. They made their mark on Parliament, and on our nation, not by aspiring to supposedly great Ministerial heights, but by playing a key scrutiny role, or by fighting from the backbenches for causes that others would not dare touch.
So, let’s give proper scrutiny, and great democratically elected scrutineers, the respect they deserve and the tools they need to do the job. Much better to have a powerful one-house solution than a system of duplication.
There is a final defence of the Lords that holds some water. In our system of parliamentary democracy, as well as providing scrutiny and debating laws, the Legislature also has to provide a pool of talent for a strong executive. The ability to create Lords has enabled Prime Ministers to appoint as ministers people with considerable experience from outside of the Commons, many of whom who have done a very good job.
But why persist with the fiction of making them Lords? Yes, appoint such experts into Government where they can strengthen it – for example if they have considerable business or foreign affairs experience. But make them accountable to the Commons – to committees where any MP could challenge them and ask questions, in the same way that they would any other minister.
The argument to abolish the Lords is in no way a criticism of its individual Members, who often do a fantastic job raising issues and campaigning on them diligently. Indeed, many of these people are just the sort of experienced experts who could be brought into the Commons committee system to strengthen it. But their expertise could be better used within a strengthened committee system, and their good work alone is not sufficient to justify the existence of an unelected House of Lords.
The main hurdle in abolishing the Lords, of course, is getting a Bill to do so through Parliament. Turkeys and Christmas, and all that. But given public support, a manifesto promise, and if necessary the temporary creation of enough new Lords to vote themselves out of existence, it is not an insurmountable problem.
If unelected, it is unjustifiable. If elected, it would cause as many problems as it would solve. The abolition of the House of Lords would be an excellent progressive, radical, cash-saving, democratisng pledge for a left-of centre election manifesto. And it would be popular too. Peers against the people anyone?
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Really thoughtful piece, Anthony. I was going to come roaring in and argue that what the Lords does provide is a load of old men who have the time and the interest to pore over Government legislation and either improve upon it or show up the holes in it.
I’ve never liked the character of the House (which, as you rightly point out, is too huntin’-fishin’-shootin’-out-of-touch-with-the-rest-of-us), but I learned to live with it as we’ve had more and more legislation on the hoof – legislation that began on the front page of the Daily Mail – through the Commons over the past decade.
However, you’ve covered all that nicely, and suggest a far more democratic way of providing the same service while beefing up the role of the backbench MP, something else that has slid from view in recent times. And of course, plenty of Lords have been caught milking the cow in the same way as their Commons counterparts.
Thanks Duncan. Not sure about youyr claim about more Mail-inspired legislation coming through. Think the Tories peaked there on a few occasions.
Incidentally, a friend called to comment on this after he read it and used the ‘at least the Lords have proper debates’ argument to me. He really meant that they can say what they like. But why? Because they have no fear of electoral consequences – ie they can say what they like and the public can’t do anything about it. That hardly strikes me as an adequate state of affairs in the long term. The Commons may not be perfect, but I’d rather take imperfect democracy any day of the week.
As someone who sat and listened to three and a half hours of their Lordships’ deliberations during last night’s committee stage of the Digital Economy Bill (it’s a riot in the younger Higgitt household) I reckon I’m in a good position today to respond to this well argued but ultimately wrong analysis.
If the Lords had equal weight in determining legislation as the Commons then I’m sure most people would agree that it would be wrong in principle and practice. But it doesn’t. Instead it does something every well-functioning system of government ought to do; scrutinise proposed new laws and ask awkward questions without fear of, or compulsion toward, demagoguery.
No, of course the Lords is not representative of a cross-section of society (though neither is it quite the preserve of the aristocracy beloved of the popular caricature). But then neither is the judiciary or the civil service. Its function is not to be of the people, or to speak for them. Instead, its purpose is to make sure laws that will affect the people are fit-for-purpose, and do not conflict with other legislation or higher principles of fairness and justice. This is specialist work, and it requires specialist talent which the Lords, being overwhelmingly comprised of life Peers appointed on the basis of talent and public service, supplies in abundance.
Anthony calls for a beefing up of the Commons committee system and, as someone who also deals closely with select committees from time to time, this is something we should do in any instance. But select committees in particular are there to scrutinise the work of government departments – they need to remain unencumbered of the treadmill of routine, detailed legislative scrutiny so that they can keep the departments on their toes. A new type of committee, between the select committee and the bill committees, could be created but I do wonder if they could focus quite as much expertise on the legislation as the Lords are able to by dint of being free from such things as casework and other representational duties.
Anthony suggests drafting in experts but this, to my mind, misses the point. The lords are not subject experts (I heave heard contributions on during the various sessions of the Digital Economy Bill that bear witness to this) but experts in constitutional and legislative probity. That type of expert is in much shorter supply. In fact, by far the best such resource is…in the House of Lords. My conclusion from this, therefore, is that if we didn’t have a second chamber, we’d probably want to end up creating something that ended up looking an awful lot like it, but without the ermine and ceremony that so gets up people’s noses. And if all we’re really talking about is sweeping away the vestiges of privilege and class, is it really necessary to abolish the entire institution?
Let’s not forget that it was their Lordships who noticed that the veto given to the Secretary of State for Wales in the Social Housing LCO was ultra vires.
OK, but hardly a justification for the continuation of the Lords in itself that.
Adam, a well-made case, but yours appears to be a case for the continuation of an unelected Lords – as I doubt an elected Lords would not perform the role in anything like the same way. Fair?
On the issue of ‘subject experts’, I agree that perhaps I’ve equated an expert on an issue too much with soemone who has something worthwhile to say. The two are not always coterminous, and in politics they’re sometimes mutually exclusive…
On the issue of select and other Committees, I agree – there is merit in differentiating between types of scrutiny – Select Committes focusing on scrutinising Departments and Committee work scrutinising specific Bills. But I don’t see how that couldn’t be built into the system.
I agree with the the absurdity of having a unelected body obstructing legislation, but if memory serves right both the parliamentary acts of 1911 and 1948? address this?
I disagree with the comments about the failures in the US over healthcare being down to the Senate. Madison’s purpose of having a second chamber was two fold. The first as a check on the house and the second to provide balance between the large states (that would have more members in the House) and the smaller states, its had its ups and downs but it is fair.
A single chamber house of commons would see more members from London and the south and less from the North and West (including Scotland Wales and Northern Ireland).
The second problem is a government being elected with a minority of the vote (1979, 83 etc) How would you address that (as you have not)
Sounds like Hailsham’s elected dictatorship to me??
Problems in the healthcare bill was because the president (with the best of intentions) decided to let Congress write the bill, instead of sending one. He also is not as agressive as LBJ was in the 1960s.
Anthony Hunt writes:
> “Much better to have a powerful one-house solution than a system of duplication.”
Duplication? I think the word you’re looking for is “deliberation.” I’m not convinced at all that a half-informed Parliament is the right institution to take great national choices. Until Tony Blair’s fiddling of the appointment process, a peerage was a reward for years of distinguished public service. These worldly-wise statesmen brought their knowledge and experience to bear on matters of state. A “powerful one-house solution” sounds an awful lot like an elected dictatorship. Thanks, but no thanks.
> “…the abolition of the abhorrent hereditary principle.”
Without the right of inheritance, there’s no private property. And without private property, there’s no liberty. As for appointed peers, the great strength of the old House of Lords was its independence. Hereditary peers owed their place neither to the government of the day nor to the electorate. They were therefore able to vote against panicky, illiberal legislation, despite the short-term public demand for it. This is the essential argument for bicameralism.
> “The House of Lords still symbolises outdated privilege and is a reactionary block on progress towards social justice.”
The 1999 reforms have left us with a system that is every bit as elitist. In the place of the hereditaries, Blair installed an army of quangocrats, tycoons and political stooges. They may be more diverse in terms of gender and ethnicity, but they are considerably less independent. Of course, a small minority of these appointments are doing a genuinely good job. But a large number were selected to serve narrow, partisan interests.
> “What is more, armed with a more powerful mandate, it would almost certainly see fit to challenge the view of the Commons more often.”
Why is this a bad thing? Over the last twelve years Labour Ministers such as John Reid and Charles Clarke have used the fear of crime and the war on terror to scare the population into accepting the end of many hard-won rights and freedoms. Without checks and balances, democracy can easily become the deadly enemy of freedom and justice.
> “And it would be popular too. Peers against the people anyone?”
Thanks, but no thanks. My preferred option is to replace the House of Lords with a Senate of seconded city and county councillors, chosen in proportion to their party strengths on each authority.
Hendre writes: “Let’s not forget that it was their Lordships who noticed that the veto given to the Secretary of State for Wales in the Social Housing LCO was ultra vires.”
Indeed. And their treatment of the LCOs through both the Constitutions Committee and on the floor of the House have been informed, helpful and measured.
Personally am far less inclined to favour any change than the author of the column, strong and interesting though his arguments are.
A difficult one, unicameral vs bicameral. I see advantages in both, but reject absolutely the idea of a chamber either appointed by the PM or by an accident of birth. If you are sold on the scrutiny idea why not create a chamber with specialist representative selected by panels? Some of the members of the Irish Senate are selected like this, would this not be a worthwhile avenue to explore?
With most of the hereditaries gone, the character of the HoL undoutedly changed fairly drastically. Ultimately however it remains fundamentally not just undemocratic but anti-democratic in its whole composition, ethos and proceedure. Neo-Burkeans who applaud the ‘balanced constitution’ and fret about ‘elective dictatorship’ can be expected to laud the Upper House for its vaunted scrutinty, independence and the distinction of its membership. Unlike Anthony I do think there is a role for a second chamber to play in respect of providing a scrutiny role that an overburdened Commons (whatever enhancements to the Select Committee system) cannot, and as a constitutional safeguard to the Commons voting to extend its own life in any circumstances short of genuine national emergency. Personally, though I have some quibbles with the detail, I think that Unlock Democracy’s response to the White Paper would represent a coherent way forward.
http://www.unlockdemocracy.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/090518-hofl-response-final.doc
Michael Jones writes:
“Without the right of inheritance, there’s no private property”
Apart from the fact that Anthony is quite obviously talking about the Hereditary principle only insofar as it applies to the HoL, this statement clearly factually wrong. I gained title to virtually all of my property without inheriting it.
Michael Cridland:
“I agree with the the absurdity of having a unelected body obstructing legislation, but if memory serves right both the parliamentary acts of 1911 and 1948? address this?”
Sort of. They stopped the veto and gradually reduced the blocking powers, but in practice the Lords can still make it very tricky for a Government to get legislation passed, especially if time is tight.
“A single chamber house of commons would see more members from London and the south and less from the North and West (including Scotland Wales and Northern Ireland).”
How and why?
“The second problem is a government being elected with a minority of the vote (1979, 83 etc) How would you address that (as you have not). Sounds like Hailsham’s elected dictatorship to me??”
To me, that’s an issue for our electoral system, not a justification for a House of Lords. Don’t know what you mean by an elected dictatorship. I’m talking about beefing up the legislature and making it more democratic, not beefing up the executive. That’s more democracy and more democratic scrutinty – the opposite of a dictatorship, surely?
Michael Jones.
Where do I start? I’m glad that someone has decided to come in with some of this – you know the stuff – ‘These bloody oiks in the Commons don’t know what’s best. Some of them don’t even have butlers etc etc.’
“Duplication? I think the word you’re looking for is “deliberation.” I’m not convinced at all that a half-informed Parliament is the right institution to take great national choices.”
Better a half-informed elected institution than a half-informed outdated unelected one. It’s called democracy. You know, it became increasingly popular around Victorian times.
“Until Tony Blair’s fiddling of the appointment process, a peerage was a reward for years of distinguished public service.”
Utter rubbish. Peerages have been given to people in the same way by PMs and Party Leaders of all colours for eons. It’s like the ‘Tony Blair created spin’ tosh that posh Tories put out. In both cases, what really gets you is that a Labour PM had the gall to operate effectively and beat you consistantly and not meekly retreat back to opposition.
“Without the right of inheritance, there’s no private property. And without private property, there’s no liberty.”
Nonsense, ably dispached over the ropes by Higgitt.
“As for appointed peers, the great strength of the old House of Lords was its independence. Hereditary peers owed their place neither to the government of the day nor to the electorate. They were therefore able to vote against panicky, illiberal legislation, despite the short-term public demand for it.”
This gets better. You seem to be following the ‘The upper classes are born to rule and shouldn’t have to bow to lowly public opinion. After all, they are better than the fickle huddled masses who don’t really know what’s best for them.’ argument. Are you serious?!?
“Blair installed an army of quangocrats, tycoons and political stooges. They may be more diverse in terms of gender and ethnicity, but they are considerably less independent.”
Even if you accept your stooges argument, the bpeople who you negatively refer to are part of an elected Government and therefore subject to the electorate, and I’d take that any day – it’s part of democracy, and democracy is worth defending. Again, you’re claiming that Blair was the first to do these things, which as I’ve said above is partisan nonsense in itself.
“A single chamber house of commons would see more members from London and the south and less from the North and West (including Scotland Wales and Northern Ireland).”
How and why?”
If you read what the rational for the US senate to provide balance between a populous states like New York and California and smaller ones like Kansas and Alaska. for example If you take London with 7 Million (and then its metropolitan area with over 13) . There would be more MPs in your single chamber from the south east than from Wales. How would address that? I think it is more than a case of electoral reform. PR I would assume, and what would happen if a party like UKIP or worse still the BNP held the balance. Your suggestion makes no plan for the separation of powers. (Which has its philosophical origins in John Locke not Edmund Burke).
I believe that the Webbs made a case for replacing House of Lords with a Chamber of Experts in their “Socialist Commonwealth”. Its a type of corporatism that was beloved of some of the Italian fascists of the 1930s.. I would prefer a chamber of nations.
On regional representation, you make an interesting point, but the UK doesn’t work on the basis of a federal system like the US does. All the options for an elected second chamber I’ve seen are based on representation roughly proportional to population. To recognise regions/nations above and beyond this proportionality would be a total step-change for our constitution. Can you really see it working? Based on which nations and what relative strength in numbers?
On PR, I wasn’t saying I agreed with changing the voting system – merely that Governments ruling with a minority of votes is the result of the FPTP system, for better or worse.
On seperation of powers, I don’t see how my plan affects this. It would not make the executive and legislature any more entwined than they already are, and if it strengthens the latter then all the better.
Anthony Hunt responds:
> “Peerages have been given to people in the same way by PMs and Party Leaders of all colours for eons.”
Yes, you’re right. Some Prime Ministers appointed peers with a view to buttressing their own power. But under Blair it was taken to the point of criminality. The Downing Street policy wonk Geoff Mulgan complained of “the scarcely concealed sale of peerages to wealthy party donors.” Traditional prime ministers, under both Tory and Labour governments, always sought to reward distinguished parliamentarians with a seat in the Lords.
> “You seem to be following the ‘The upper classes are born to rule and shouldn’t have to bow to lowly public opinion.’
I was raised by working-class parents on a working-class estate. So please, enough of the Dave Spartism. My admiration for the old House of Lords does not imply any special admiration for wig-wearing Viscounts. I believe in a non-elected upper chamber because the executive of the lower chamber plays a big role in the selection of parliamentary candidates for safe seats. One of the great strengths of the old House of Lords was its independence. I agree with you that public opinion is a great way of translating preferences into policy – and on issues like immigration, the Labour Party has shown no regard for the opinions of ordinary people. However, the role of the upper chamber is not to initiate Bills, but to block and amend legislation.
> “[sarcastically] After all, they are better than the fickle huddled masses who don’t really know what’s best for them.”
If you’re a genuine believer in the wisdom of crowds may I suggest an article on the repatriation of powers from the European Union? Much has been made of the danger of two chambers in a mano-a-mano death match, but when you consider the control that the unelected Brussels commission has this is not a factor.
> “Better a half-informed elected institution than a half-informed outdated unelected one. It’s called democracy.”
Well, no, actually. The proper term for elected elites is “polyarchy”. This is a system in which a small group restricts participation to choosing leaders in elections managed by competing elites, which gives too much weight to ill-thought preferences relative to strong or well-formed preferences. Real democracy, which requires control of the agenda, can only be achieved through direct democracy: a radical decentralisation of power from the European Commission to Westminster, from Westminster to the National Assembly, from the National Assembly to local government, and from local government to the individual citizen.
I agree with Daran that this is a strong and interesting article, but I’m disappointed with Mr Hunt for resorting to ad hominem arguments.
Partially agree with Michael’s last point: let’s keep it civil, chaps.
Will do, be assured my intention was to be combative rather than rude. Nowt wrong with a bit of disagreement.
Your last post clarifies some of your points much better than your first. I’m not saying I want mob rule, just a happy medium from the disregard that unelected Lords have in the past shown for the feelings of normal men and women. But on Blair’s record and on the Upper House, I guess we’ll just have to agree to disagree. Thanks for doing so though, it made the thread far more interesting.
Anthony, I think your response to my point is correct and hits the nail on the head regarding the problem with the “English Constitution” (to use title of Walter Bagehot’s famous 19th Century work) is its centralised powers. Which why the US did not adopt it. I would agree with your observation concerning the EU and its unrepresentative bureaucracy .