What if he’s right?
Devil or devolutionist?
HOW much support does Peter Hain’s cautious approach to a third devolution referendum enjoy? Rightly or wrongly, the Welsh Secretary copped much of the blame for a fairly chaotic day of joint statements in response to Sir Emyr Jones Parry’s All Wales Convention’s report earlier this week.
At the end of it all, a form of words emerged that appeared to satisfy all sides (i.e both sides within Labour, as well as Plaid) and which ruled nothing in or out. The Western Mail‘s Tomos Livingstone captured Labour’s pickle splendidly when he suggested that its AMs were now free to trigger the referendum process but “then, after the General Election, Labour will consult itself on whether that was the right thing to do or not. It’s not clear what happens if Labour then decides it shouldn’t have triggered the referendum - and if it’s lost power at Westminster by then it can’t do anything about it anyway.”
Whether we arrived at such abstruseness because of the force of Peter Hain’s personality, or because he speaks for a sizable section of his party (and possibly of other parties) remains unclear. But it is the nub of how things unfold from here. If the Neath MP really is the lone voice beloved of others’ characterisations, the chances are we will proceed to the mooted autumn vote. If not, further twists and turns await.
Hain’s motives remain the subject of almost as much speculation. Some argue that he is appeasing the anti-devolutionist faction in Labour and among Labour MPs. Others suggest he has become an anti-devolutionist. The former is hard to reconcile with the sincerity with which he advances his case. The latter is just plain daft. When the Neath MP told AMs earlier this week that no-one worked harder than him to deliver devolution in 1997 he was not exaggerating. Indeed, as a young campaign worker during that summer I witnessed his formidable dedication to getting the “yes” vote out at first hand. If some other senior Labour politicans of that time had shown as much willingness to pound the streets the result might have been a good deal less tight.
There are two other theories that budding Peter Hain Kremlinologists ought also to consider. The first is that he really does want to give the LCO system more time to prove itself. This should not be that hard to believe; it was during Hain’s last tenure at Gwydyr House that the Act was passed, and he has remained an advocate of Part 3 ever since. Few stand alongside the Neath MP on that, but if you want to read a rare – if qualified – defence of the status quo this pamphlet, co-authored by WalesHome.org’s Daran Hill, is worth a look.
The second is that his caution is sincerely grounded in pessimism about whether a “yes” vote can be secured. Again, majority opinion within the political classes is not on the Secretary of State’s side. Indeed, to even question the wisdom of pushing ahead with a referendum is sometimes deemed to be anti-devolutionist. What is more, these “yaysayers” have some numbers behind then; all eight opinion polls that have tested the public’s voting intentions on the matter have put the “yes” side ahead, with a mean average lead of 10.5%. And now the All Wales Convention says an affirmative vote is obtainable (adding, somewhat needlessly, that there can be “no certainty” about this). Amid this, a continuing reluctance to press ahead invites charges of ulterior motives.
Probe the data a little harder, however, and the logic of holding off might induce less indignation, or fewer accusations of duplicity. There were eight opinion polls in the run up to the 1997 referendum, all of which put the “yes” side ahead, and which produced a combined average lead of 9.6% – uncomfortably similar to today. It was, of course, a different time, and comparisons can be misleading. Voters’ fears of the unknown are no longer a factor. But then, neither is the support of large numbers of people persuaded by the message that “Tony Blair wants you to vote yes”.
We need to know how those opinion poll numbers are likely to translate into real votes in real ballot boxes if the assessment is to be worthwhile. The All Wales Convention provides some elaboration in its research, assessing support against likelihood to vote. Here, it found a modest “yes” lead (7%) among the quarter of of voters least likely to vote and a very decent lead (28%) among the fifth or of voters moderately likely to vote. However, among the half of all voters most likely to vote (a share that mirrors the 50% turnout in 1997) the lead is just 3%.
We also need to understand the intensity of support, or in polling parlance how “hard” or “soft” the numbers are. The qualitative component of the Convention’s research helps here as well. It finds that most people occupy what it terms the “cautious optimist” position, characterised by being “broadly in favour of increased powers…but [with] key concerns and questions about its implications.” Moreover, the research finds that as a result of a detailed debate “those who were ’strongly’ in favour began to question the details of increased powers and tended to move towards being ‘cautious optimists’”. This demonstrates a softness that cannot just be dismissed. Coupled with that, a full one in four respondents believe that the term “full law making powers” means that “Wales will be independent from the UK”. Given the unpopularity of that particular constitutional outcome, this is likely to depress the potential “yes” vote without very detailed (i.e lengthy) clarification.
For those passionate about more powers these findings can appear like so much nit-picking, or as matters to be addressed as part of an inclusive and vigourous campaign. It is true that attitudes can change once the issue stops being hypothetical and starts to become real. However, it is not just a question of “going for it”. The consequences of failure are very real. They may not be as dramatic as setting the cause of devolution back by several decades, as Messers Hain and Morgan claimed in that statement, but at the very least they would stall law-making powers for a minimum of five years, and they run the likelihood of seeing a diluted proposition take the place of Part 4. As discussed before, this is not like Ireland. There is no great external impetus that could cause an early re-run. Nor, it must also be noted, is there any real prospect that anything short of a crushing “no” vote could kill further devolution.
It is reasonable to turn this analysis on its head and ask not what is to fear from an early vote, but what is to be gained from a later one. It is a good point; while the general anti-politics mood that permeates much debate now may subside, there will always be other reasons to put off a vote. It is possible to imagine a climate of harsh public service cuts undermining the case for more powers, by making the debate look irrelevant and the institution look useless or cruel. Then there is the grounded fear that a longer time horizon will simply induce more procrastination from Labour and the Conservatives. All or none of these could happen. One thing that is unlikely , however, is that people will go off the idea of devolution, or will want to draw the line here. All the evidence suggests that people’s belief and confidence in a Welsh polity will only grow, and with it their willingness to invest in it more power and authority. The politically savvy may be frustrated with LCOs, but most voters haven’t even heard of them, let along concluded that they are sub-optimal.
In the long run, more powers for the Welsh Assembly is as good a done deal as its possible to get in politics. About the only thing that can really disrupt it is a botched, premature and mis-timed referendum. Hain’s caution could in fact be devolution’s biggest asset right now.
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Dunno. He could be right. Spot on. But the fact that it’s coming from Hain makes me not care. Seriously. It’s like Brown telling us that the economy is booming – could well be, but I don’t think anyone would believe him.
Now if it was Rhodri saying it, or Dafydd El, or Nick Bourne, or Kirsty W, and Hain saying let’s do it, then I would probably think ‘yeah, ok, lets think about it’. But the fact that the AMs generally are all for an early one seems just like more Hain interference.
Basically, if he’s seen as anti-referrendum, it’s because he’s created that perception, cried wolf too many times, to the point where people take everything he says with a large pinch, even if he’s spot-on. So he may not be anti-devolution, but he’s currently not doing it any favours either.
That’s a very good way of viewing it, Al: Hain’s public image – and his intervention – is hurting the process. Good argument.
Your’s too, A – even if I disagree vehemently with its central premise. More on that to follow – I hope.
Great piece, and one that has turned upside down everything I thought about Hain’s motivations, or at any rate complicates them.
He hasn’t helped himself by his own posturing and stalling, so it’s hard to think the best of his motives in this case. He has a history of negativity towards devolution, i.e. the actual practical implementation of it, rather than the idea of it, which he likes to trumpet he believes in. He has in fact been against every single attempt to extend or properly bed down devolution, from the Richard Commission onwards. He may well believe in it in the abstract, but who cares about the abstract?
The bottom line is that the majority for a Yes is clear (because consistent) but not exactly decisive. I think what’s angered so many people is that he plays into the antis’ hands by this stalling and posturing and by seeming to be London’s enforcer in Cardiff. There’s nothing fixed about those polls – I imagine they’re going to be volatile to the end, so anything that injects uncertainty, disunity, causes delays and general constitutional fumbling, is a drain of the Yes momentum.
Add to that the fact that the Yes camp are still scratching their arses on the starting blocks, and the Nos are already completing the first lap (and have been for a year or so), and I think that Hain is basically undermining those in the Labour party who are gagging to start. I imagine Rhodri Morgan has had to (or been told to) bite his tongue and keep his mouth shut on so many things lately (after having to retract his welcome for the Richard Commission for instance) that the real harm Hain causes is to Labour pro-devolution morale.
What I’m interested in knowing is what Gordon Brown thinks. My theory, supported by the small amount I know, is that Brown is actually quite pro-devolution and would have quite happily devolved further powers in decisive steps or increments, or would indeed support a Yes vote publicly. But that he’s not in a position of strength to fend off his own Welsh MPs the way Blair was. Which is why he’s keeping out of the debate, while in Scotland his people are very comfortable with the increasing self-determination Scotland has, and considers its right, and which Scottish Labour feels thoroughly invested in and comfortable with.
The problem with those who want a referendum is soon as possible is that they genuinely believe to quote one blogger that there is a’ unstoppable juggarnaut for more powers’. The evidence for this seems to be a couple of opinion polls suggesting a slight majority for more lawmaking powers. Yet outside of the political bubble I just don’t don’t detect a huge interest in the subject either way from ordinary people. The day of the Jones-Parry report I attended a Labour Party meeting. There were about 20 party members present including some under 30! I deliberately didn’t say anything and no one raised the issue. it wasn’t important. What was important was the threatened closure of our local swimming pool. In 1997 I was there. In fact I faced a disciplinary panel of the local Labour party because I supported devolution. During the campaign the Labour Party held two focus groups which showed that the vote could be very close. At the count we all thought it had been lost as box after box from the Bridgend constituency came in with large and in some cases very large ‘no’ majorities. The tide turned in the county borough of Bridgend because of the boxes from the traditional Labour areas in the Ogmore constituency. Why did they vote yes? It was precisely as Adam points out because they were loyal to the new Labour government and because the Tories were against devolution. Those conditions don’t exist today. A future yes vote cannot be won without a united Labour party and the active support of Labour activists. In many parts of Wales Plaid Cymru hardly exists as a political organisation.
The truth of the matter is that no one knows what the result of any referendum will be. In 1997 and in Assembly elections large numbers of voters decided not to take part in the democratic process. What if they now decide to vote? Those in favour of a yes vote have to spell out the concrete advantages. What laws are not being passed, for example, by the Westminster government which would benefit Wales? The argument that lawmking powers will protect Wales from a Tory government in Westminster is complete nonsense when the Assembly relies entirely from a grant from the UK government. If people want to protect Wales from the Tories then the only way to do that is to ensure that there are no distraction to the fight to stop them winning the next election. The argument that Wales should have the same powers as Scotland has also been shot in the foot by this week’s White Paper which raises the possibility of serious tax raising powers for the devolved administrations. Rather than criticising Peter Hain, those who want a ‘yes’ vote should be putting together the case for such a change. The Scottish White Paper and the comments by Jim Murphy have frankly in my opinion moved the devolution debate on from just asking the question of do you want to move from Part 3 to Part 4 of the 2006 Act. The real question that now should be put is do you want a lawmaking Assembly which will have tax raising powers even if this means a reduction in the block grant from Westminster. Listening to David Davis last night I think that this approach has an attraction even for Tories because it increases localism and provides greater accountability and transparency to decision making.
Patrick
“He may well believe in it in the abstract, but who cares about the abstract?”
I must confess, this troubled me while I was writing the piece. It’s legitimate for devolutionists to challenge Hain to do more than say “not yet”.
I agree with what you say about his actions depressing the “yes” vote/campaign. But I also think we are in an atmosphere where anyone who suggests anything other that an immediate “yes” vote, or casts doubts about its obtainability, is branded an Uncle Tom. Not helpful, either.
It was always a forlorn hope that the Convention would be able to deliver a politics-proof assessment of the prospect of a “yes” vote; that’s not how these things work. But there is evidence in it to suggest a longer run-up could increase the changes of that happening.
Jeff
Spot on. The fiscal devolution debate is the dog that doesn’t bark. At a time when discussion is relatively advanced on law-making powers, nobody on any side has done anything much more than discuss whether there should be a need-based grant or a population-based grant. Amazing, really.
I struggle to understand how someone who spends a huge amount of time and effort spreading rumours that a referendum can not be won (even though all opinion polls and the convention established partly by his own party say otherwise) and tries to destabilise and collapse a referendum supporting government can in fact be a good thing for the referendum.
Make no mistake the campaign will need to work hard to win the referendum. I don’t think anyone is under any other impression. But also make no mistake that Peter Hain has Peter Hain’s own self interest at heart with this and not the success of a referendum.
“In many parts of Wales Plaid Cymru hardly exists as a political organisation.”
Plaid and UKIP are the only parties to get over 1000 votes in every constituency arent they? I guess getting 1000 people to vote for you is a sure sign of non-existence…
Sorry. Just a quick point of order. I am out of the game of commenting…
Che
The suggestion that Hain’s pessimism itself depresses the potential “yes” vote is a good one; overwhelmingly the politicians are participants rather than observers in this process.
All I’m saying is that if you sweep away all the controversy, claim and counter-claim away from the referendum debate there may be good grounds for taking a longer run-up at it. That’s not to say it can’t be won next Autumn.
Hain’s whole premise is a mockery of democratic process. If you only hold a referendum when you are sure of the outcome, what is the point of holding a referendum?
Alwyn
Not a valid observation, in my view. Or, if it is, it is also an argument against the One Wales agreement commitment to “to assess the levels of support for full law-making powers necessary to trigger the referendum.”
I’m not so sure about Gordon Brown’s commitment to devolution. I know he supported it in 1979 and wrote about it extensively in the 1980s but I do wonder whether he prefers the theory rather than the practice.
Jeff,
I take your point (and, to a degree, agree with it, but for different reasons than you) but not your example. At constituency level, it is absolutely right that local issues come ahead of the big picture. It may surprise you to learn that at a Plaid constituency meeting here in Neath this week that while there was a short discussion on the All Wales Convention, the overwhelming bulk of the evening was given over to local issues and campaigning. As it should be.
I’m also becoming wearied by this mantra that “the people of Wales aren’t interested” coming increasingly from Labour. Say it enough times and everyone will believe it, I suppose. To Hell with the LCO argument. Something far more fundamental lies behind this referendum: do you want your decisions made in Wales or in London? I’m sure most people, regardless of their political colour, have a view on that.
Jeff, all that is true. You know more than I do about Labour voting patterns and reasons, but you say the referendum can’t be won without a united Labour party and activists.
The 97 referendum was won without exactly that. In a way that’s why we’ve paid the price in terms of the convoluted and rubbishy settlement we got. The problem with Labour surface unity at any price is that it basically premises continuing Labour disunity under the surface and bubbling over for years. It premises, as it were, a need for unity that ends up being an end in itself, i.e. takes up so much time and energy to achieve that there’s none left for thinking about what one might do with that unity. That’s where I feel Laboru is re devolution now.
Sometimes trying for unity actually embeds disunity and variance as part of the structure (see the Church of England’s contortionism re gay marriage, women priests, then bishops etc) rather than copes with it. Ask Rowan Williams….
I can see why Labour pro-devolutionists have to be cautious. Completely. I was one and the mentality is still there. But I am concerned about the seepage effect of negativity, and also I just don’t trust Hain’s motives any more.
But you and Adam are certainly right that the unhelpful pro-devolution kneejerk rhetoric is to attack all caution as automatically anti-devolution.
This is in part because the pro-devolution Yes vote narrative is so unformed and dispersed and the purveyors of that narrative so unsure of themselves, whereas the No is a simple hard caucus.
I like Duncan Higgitt’s comment …To Hell with the LCO argument. Something far more fundamental lies behind this referendum: do you want your decisions made in Wales or in London?
I would like to ask a further (simplistic) question.
Is a public referendum really the right approach to gaining more decision-making powers? There will always be furious arguments for and against full devolution based on people’s perception of the relative (in)competences of the people in power. It stands to reason and most people would agree that any devolved Welsh government needs the legislative tools (powers) with which to do a proper job so why go to all this trouble to ask a question to which the answer is obvious. I don’t think people want to be asked this question. I don’t think a referendum would give the clear cut mandate that politician’s are so desirous of because people aren’t listening.
What is needed is a General Election and for the parties to have …’ we will take more legislative powers for Wales’ as part of their manifestos. People who don’t want this can factor that into their voting decisions.
Very interesting, Adam.
You’ll no doubt have read my “Hain’s delusion explained” post, in which I looked at some of Peter Hain’s attitudes to the referendum numbers.
http://syniadau–buildinganindependentwales.blogspot.com/2009/11/hains-delusion-explained.html
The nub of the problem is this: Peter thinks ONLY in terms of “Labour vs Tories”, therefore he looks at the likely referendum result only in terms of whether Labour can get their own supporters to vote Yes. He can see that a majority of Labour supporters will, but not a comfortable majority, and that naturally worries him. But he has dismissively ignored the number of Tory voters who will vote Yes. In fact he’s buried his own head so deep that he doesn’t believe any Tory supporters will vote Yes.
In the last referendum, the Yes vote was delivered by presenting it as as “Labour vs Tories” issue … or at least that’s how it was done in the Labour heartlands. As you said the message was, “Tony Blair wants you to vote Yes” … the Tories don’t, therefore it’s a party political issue.
If this next referendum is fought in the same way, Peter Hain has good reason to be less than optimistic, mainly because Labour’s popularity is so much lower than it was. And even if such tactics were to increase the margin in favour among Labour supporters, they are likely to correspondingly alienate and therefore decrease the number of Yes votes from Tory supporters.
Therefore the Yes campaign will need to use different tactics.
But Peter Hain is so bound by his own tribalism that he won’t be able to do that. That’s HIS problem (and perhaps also a few other MPs) and it is explained by the “hard-wired” Westminster political culture of “Labour vs Tories … and no one else counts”. It doesn’t work that way in the Assembly (that’s why Hain was laughed at when he tried it in his speech) because a different political culture has developed in Cardiff Bay … and THAT is what the Yes campaign needs to build on.
After all, this referendum is about what the Assembly can and cannot do. So it makes much more sense to conduct the Yes campaign based on Assembly political culture and values rather than those of Westminster.
Hi MH
Yes, I did read your piece. As always, very thorough and cogently argued. Clearly, I am in no position to offer any insight into Hain’s own calculations. You may be right that he is thinking of it in terms of a Labour vs Tory fight. The evidence I cited in the article demonstrates I hope that you don’t need to subscribe to that to have some anxieties about the intensity of support and the proportion of supporters who will actually vote – regardless of party affiliation.
Allow me to put it another way: imagine that there was no suspicion about Labour’s commitment, or any need for Plaid to demonstrate to its members that it could secure more powers via a coalition with Labour. Imagine the debate wasn’t weighed down with questions about whether Wales should be in the UK, or not. if we were able to take a look at the situation without these complications. I suggest it’d go a little like this:
a) We want a referendum as soon as possible so that the Assembly can acquire extra powers to help it do good things, but:
b) It seems likely that that the longer we leave it, the greater the chance of a a “yes” vote. What is more, a decisive “yes” would lay to rest the disquiet people still feel today about devolution as a result of a very narrow vote last time
I suggest that under that scenario, we’d trade a delay in getting the powers against a bigger and more certain endorsement. And that’s what I mean by a more credible strategy for delivering a “yes” vote.
At this point, people will say “ah, but a deal’s a deal – Labour and Plaid agreed to hold the vote by May 2011″. Quite right. They did. And that should be honoured. But it’s important to recognise that this is a deadline inserted to suit the internal political objectives of one partner. If we were able to strip that away, it might – might – make sense to build things up a bit.
“Che
The suggestion that Hain’s pessimism itself depresses the potential “yes” vote is a good one; overwhelmingly the politicians are participants rather than observers in this process.
All I’m saying is that if you sweep away all the controversy, claim and counter-claim away from the referendum debate there may be good grounds for taking a longer run-up at it. That’s not to say it can’t be won next Autumn.”
I disagree but I don’t say that it is not a valid argument. I don’t also say that Hain could not be right that a referendum can fail, although personally I think one should and will take place and it should and will win. My only point here is that I can not for the life of me agree that anything at all Hain has done is of anyway positive about the referendum and there is no way he is an asset. That said I will be very suprised if on the day the referendum is won he is not up on stage calling himself the father of devolution and claiming success for the victory.
Top piece Adam. I think Peter has had an unfairly rough ride on this one, with zealots convinced of their own case not engaging with the political realities of tight polls and the current political climate, which as you point out, is markedly different from 97. Anyone who has spoken with him knows that he is genuine on this – it’s just that as a grown up politician, he realises what is at stake.
If a referendum does NOT happen for whatever reasons, and Scotland then gets further powers through the Calman Commission (I believe both Labour and the Tories have signed up to this but do not know for sure), doesn’t that open up an even wider gap between Welsh and Scottish devolution?
It’s true that that is not automatically a problem, Wales should not frequently be compared to Scotland, but it is a fact that the people of Wales consistently desire a similar devolution settlement to the one enjoyed by people in Scotland.
Further, if the referendum doesn’t happen, could a future coalition agreement at the Assembly result in a post-2011 referendum that has even more options on the table? Parity with the newly strengthened Scotland perhaps?
Another unanswered question is that how is Scotland able to receive hugely significant further powers (including more fiscal powers) without going through a referendum yet we aren’t? We are not the same here in Wales, but political parties here could make the appropriate manifesto commitments to deliver proper devolution without going through confusing and contorted referenda.
interesting piece Adam, i agree with others who say that Peter Hain could well be right, but he is part of the problem.
i also wanted to respond your’s an Jeff Jones comments on the Financial issues and the main reason is that its easier to discuss law making powers than it is to talk about Tax, National Insurance, Budget deficits. Stock Markets etc,
One of the other reasons for financial changes are not discussed is the lack of knowledge and interest in Financial matters by the politicians in Cardiff Bay and the political parties they represent , taking away the ‘blame Westminster for the budget squeeze’ option for many Ministers and politicians would be like taking away their comfort blanket, im not sure many could cope.
Also look at the response from HM Treasury to the Holtham Commission even with its limited recommendations for change were all but ignored by Ministers and Civil Servants at a UK level , so what chance is there of meaningful change when neither the Labour Party or Conservatives believe in or can imagine giving up fiscal and financial powers to any of the devolved administrations without breaking up the UK, something that might actually benefit them in the medium and long term.
There are also groups like True Wales who in their response to the suggestion of a Welsh Stock Market raised on your blog by Jenny Randerson pandered to the worst fears of many about sky high taxes, Stalinist levels of poverty and the end of the UK, and if that is all people hear on the matters then until we get counter arguments to that kind of nonsense through credible rational arguments and individuals the debate is lost before its started.
There are people putting ideas forward but its not as sexy to the press as spats between the parties over lawmaking, so to raise the profile of the debate on economic and financial powers we need leadership and courage and credible individuals in these fields and for the body politic to listen and engage about the issues, it also means a step change in thinking, something that will take time for many politicians and the public to adjust, but is not impossible to achieve.
Adam, the key words in you first paragraph were “some anxieties”. Of course there will be SOME anxieties, but there isn’t any reason to have MORE than that. It comes back to the idea of only having a referendum when you’re SURE of winning it. Is that 100% sure … 90% sure … 80% sure … ?
Nobody will EVER be 100% sure. It’s a chimera. Setting impossible targets is just an excuse for putting things off … and off … and off …
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Moving on, I’d take issue with your suggestion b, namely that the longer we leave it, the greater the chance of a Yes vote.
I don’t think that’s true. The polls all show, and have done for some time, that we will get a Yes vote now. So why wait? We’re not increasing the chance of a Yes vote, we’re simply increasing the margin of victory. More importantly, if we do not take this opportunity now (i.e. set up the referendum while Labour still have a majority in Westminster) I don’t think we will get a second chance for many years.
David Cameron will be put under immense pressure from Welsh Tory MPs (who are all against primary lawmaking powers) to go back on his declaration. And, whatever he says, the cold, hard politics of power will make the Tories very reluctant to let go of the lever of control that the SoSW currently has over new areas of legislation.
And even if the Tories DO keep their word on not vetoing a referendum, they can still do quite a lot to make winning it less likely. Do Labour want important things such as the wording of the question (although the wording has to be approved by the Electoral Commission) and the exact date (imagine a referendum in the middle of a cold, hard January in 2012 or 2013) to be left in the hands of a Tory SoSW?
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Your closing paragraph was quite amazing, Adam. A delusion worthy of Hain himself. The referendum isn’t about “the internal political objectives of one partner” … a majority in ALL parties in the Assembly (and of course Trish Law, to make it unanimous) wants primary lawmaking powers. For Labour in particular there are cold, hard, political reasons for them to do so because it will mean Labour policies (since Labour are likely to remain the largest party in the Assembly) can be delivered in Wales through the Assembly even if Labour lose control in Westminster.
That is the political REALITY that makes it in Labour’s OWN interest to make sure we have the referendum in 2010, rather than in a few more years’ time … quite irrespective of the small matter of sticking to a signed agreement.
“Would lay to rest the disquiet people still feel today about devolution as a result of a very narrow vote last time.”
I have difficulty in buying into this assertion. We’ve had the National Assembly and a Welsh Government for 10 years and what it does is part of the modern Welsh public’s everyday dialogue. Not only do people quite easily identify where the Assembly sits and what assistance it can provide (which, to me, means they understand its powers), but they also actively seek help from it. Speak to AMs and they’ll tell you that their casework just gets busier and busier.
It’s a leap from there to further powers, but my point is that what happened with the Yes vote was over a decade ago. In the intervening years, we’ve all had plenty of opportunity to get used to and become advantaged by the Assembly. Most of us have become convinced. As such, looking back over our shoulder to what happened in 97 becomes rather academic. If we forget what happened then and concentrate on now(and, Adam, I have you to thank for this soundbite) that surely makes the question not “why?”, but “why not?”
MH
Let’s not be pedantic here. “Some anxieties” means credible grounds for doubting that the vote can be won on the basis of existing public opinion. You say the polls show it’ll be “yes”. I acknowledge as much. But the poll of those who will actually vote shows that margin to be just 3% – within the margin of error, in other words.
Why wait? I’ve explained that, too. A very significant slice of the electorate don’t even understand what “full law-making powers” means, let alone can be relied upon to a) care enough to vote on it and b) vote “yes”. Others go cooler on the idea when they learn more about it. It very may well be that this is a process of explanation that can be carried out between now and autumn 2010. But you’d have an even better chance if more time was taken.
I do appreciate the political calculations around the fact of a forthcoming General Election and potential change of government. I really do. But perhaps you underestimate the extent to which the “near-term campaign” will not only blot out most meaningful public debate about more powers, but will also make the politicians act in crazy ways. “One campaign at a time” might have been a campaign slogan and recommendation of strategy, but to me it is as much a statement of inescapable political fact. We just don’t have a rich enough public debating space to conduct simultaneous discussions about who should run the UK AND how much power the Welsh Assembly should have. What that means is that the debate on powers does not really kick off until perhaps as late as June 2010 – as few as four (summer) months from the vote itself. Let’s be realistic about what can be achieved in that sort of timescale.
As for my closing paragraph, I suggest you re-read it. I did not say that the referendum itself was about the internal political objectives of one partner. I said the deadline of May 2011 was – an important difference. Why May 2011? Because Plaid needs to be able to show its membership that coalition with Labour was worth it. By all means criticise Labour for trying to bend this issue to its political objectives. Just don’t pretend it’s the only party doing it.
Dunc
Yup. But, to borrow a phrase, winning people around to devolution is a process, not an event. The more we go on, the better people like it. Public opinion has moved an awfully long way in favour. It’ll move further still.
But let’s not imagine that people don’t still harbour reservations – 1 in 5 of all voters still want the institution abolished, for heaven’s sake! There is work to be done. To us, the debate is long since won and dreadfully old hat. It ain’t like that everywhere. Ten years is an age to us; to some it’s still quite novel.
I have absolutely no doubt that the narrowness of the vote in ’97 made it much harder for people to accept devolution than it might have been. The residual effects of that are still detectable today. Even if you believe otherwise, why would we choose a narrow endorsement tomorrow when there is the chance of a big endorsement the day after?
Adam, apologies for not getting the point about timing.
And I’m certainly not pretending that the political realities I decribed ONLY revolve around Labour. Of course they apply to all political parties, including Plaid, as you said. I’m only focussing on Labour because the ball is currently in their court. I’m trying to convince Labour politicians about why they need get the referendum order through while they still have a majority in Westminster to do it.
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We perhaps don’t disagree too much. You are definitely right about the Yes campaign not presenting the arguments to the public until the dust has settled after the general election.
I’d like to see the referedum on the last Thursday in October before the clocks go back, because that will have an affect on turnout, which we need to be high to capture the 28% Yes margin in the “moderately likely” group you mentioned. That leaves, as you said, a maximum of 4 or 5 months to make the case.
But what we need to do is think of the Yes campaign in TWO stages. The first stage is to set up a “council of war” to work out the right strategies. We can and should do that in January, hand-in-hand with the decision to set the referendum order in progress. This, I’m sure, is what Huw Irranca Davies (speaking for many) meant by “finding a plan to engage with the wider public in Wales and ask their views on these issues” rather then “to launch into some sort of Yes campaign solely driven by the political elite”.
The only thing I would say is that this needs to involve Yes strategists from ALL parties and other interested groups, rather than just Labour or Labour and Plaid. We would need to test out the effectiveness of different strategies and approaches in focus groups and the like to see which ones work best. Then in June (or perhaps later) we launch stage two, the public campaign, and hit the ground running.
I’ve been planning a post on this very subject, and it should come out some time over the weekend.
MH – “But what we need to do is think of the Yes campaign in TWO stages. The first stage is to set up a “council of war” to work out the right strategies. We can and should do that in January, hand-in-hand with the decision to set the referendum order in progress. ”
This mirrors the approach in 1997. Umbrella campaign and presence from January, with real campaign kicking off after election.
Since a No campaign already exists, a Yes campaign must have some sort of shape. And there is no embryo fit for purpose