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Fade away - bin Laden's survival no longer remains the burning question

CONSPIRACY theories never work for the simple reason that real life is both far more humdrum and exciting. This paradox helps explain why so many of them are obviously a figment of someone’s fevered imagination. There is an absence of crushing reality, no acceptance that someone as ethereal as Princess Diana could meet her death at the hands of a drunk driver. At the same time, there is no element of the black swan, the “you couldn’t make it up” we say to one another as some kind of conclusion to a shocking event.

Conspiracy theories have become the plaything of people who spend too much time on the internet. Instead of World of Warcraft, they wasted years discussing black helicopters and utterly failed to predict the silver airliners that so violently brought us in to the 21st Century.

Now though, as the eighth anniversary of 9-11 passes by, a new plot is in town – one that squares the circle, ropes in the US government’s dark designs and follows familiar themes of back door tyranny and collusion with outside forces. It suggests that Osama bin Laden, the “9-11 mastermind” (more of which later) has been dead for years, that he never escaped Tora Bora, caught either in a massive explosion or dead from a kidney complaint that couldn’t survive the rigours of life as a fugitive in the Tribal Areas.

He is, of course, buried in an unmarked grave, but this is also explained away. For if the remains of bin Laden are even found, the US government and its insidious allies will no longer have a reason to prosecute its ongoing conflict against Islamists which began, in the best Orwellian tradition, so as to divert attention away from its real battle against democracy. A case of “War is peace” made real.

Like all conspiracy theories, this one requires a cast of thousands utterly devoid of any kind of compassion toward their fellow man, and able to maintain an absolute wall of silence. They are helped in this way by placemen hacks and patsy politicians.

It’s probable that bin Laden has passed on, if only for the reason that he appears to love the limelight as much as Katie Price, and would have surely done better with his missives in the intervening years. But suggesting his death is a problem for his enemies rather than the marginalised and disparate survivors that make up the remnants of al-Qaeda sounds like an excuse for those theorists who spent sometimes decades discussing the world’s hidden gears but never saw the advent of asymmetrical warfare.

It’s a dog-eat-dog in the world of Islamic extremism, and you are only as good as your last atrocity. Foreigners of all hues have never been that popular in Afghanistan, and arab fighters were little more than tolerated, even though they were prepared to give their lives in the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s. Even under the Taliban, kindred spirits for Wahabists, there was much grumbling about their al-Qaeda guests. It is a paradox – another paradox – that Western governments claim that were we to withdraw from the country, al-Qaeda would find its way back in alongside the Taliban, when in fact Afghans are heartily sick of anyone who provokes outside intervention.

Then there is the Sheikh. All kinds of stories circulate about the real bin Laden, including that he had his days of wine, women and song before the austerity years. It may only be coincidence that these tales come from western biographers. What is apparent, from the times when his life is documented, is that he has a track record of seeking out mentors, and has been greatly influenced by two or three key male figures in his life.

Given that he was one of 57 children, perhaps it is not that surprising that he would go looking for father figures. For this reason, many attribute Ayman al-Zawahiri, the former leader of Islamic Jihad until it merged with al-Qaeda and now bin Laden’s number two, as the real brains of the outfit. The Emir instead owes his position to his deep pockets. In place of a terrorist mastermind at the head of a global network of Islamic jihadists, an impressionable individual flattered for his finances emerges. There is also a credible argument that his involvement in 9-11 only went so far as ying for it, that Mohamed Atta and the others finalised their plans before coming to him to some kind of a grisly, Dragon’s Den-style investors pitch.

This pyramidic structure used by our governments to describe the threat against us remains the most troublesome part of the al-Qaeda equation. The organisation never amounted to that much in the first place. Certainly, that is the view of Jason Burke, whose book, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, remains the authoritative book on the subject. To suggest that bin Laden is some kind of military genius who can plot freely against his foes from the caverns of the Waziri badlands while successfully eluding his quarries – the best trained and resourced, and now the most experienced soldiers on the planet – as well as the entire might of western technology bent towards finding him, is some way beyond farcical.

Al-Qaeda never amounted to much as a fighting outfit. But now they have become something far more nebulous – and frightening. In Histoire d’un crime, there are the following lines: “A stand can be made against an invasion by an army; no stand can be made against invasion by an idea”.

It has been 132 years since Victor Hugo’s novel about Napoleon III’s assumption of power in France was first published, some 20 years since the end of the Cold War and eight years since 9-11. Yet we still have issues in dealing with this new development in warfare. There is much talk of denying the enemy a safe base, yet Islamist terrorism’s real home is on the internet. All that is required is a group of dispossessed young, western Muslims with online access. Al-Qaeda isn’t an organisation, it’s a ‘me, too’ philosophy.

Once that is realised, it remains questionable whether bin Laden’s capture or death is desirable, as decapitation strikes don’t work on the Hydra. It is also time to recognise that both the UK and the US face different problems. This country has a sizeable community with roots in Pakistan. Its continued destabilisation, combined with disenfranchisement here, is what we must concentrate on if we are to really improve our security.

The four bombers of July 7, 2005 made no reference to either al-Qaeda or its leader, instead citing British involvement in the Iraq War as justification. These attacks provide us with the basis for our answers. The only link they have with 9-11 is that it provided the inspiration. Bin Laden, if he ever mattered to us, certainly doesn’t matter any more.