Devolution can win – and has won

Abdel Baset al-Megrahi's triumphant return to Libya was an embarrassment for UK governments

IT WAS a story few editors could have resisted. Indeed, by mid-morning on Sunday, none had. The BBC, abandoning its preferred method of sitting on the fence – by getting Andrew Marr to lead the paper review with the tale, served up with a healthy dose of scepticism – had thrown its hat in the ring and moved the al-Megrahi letters to the top of its news along with everybody else.

As we began to digest the developments, a slow sense of horror washed over many people on this side of the border. What about devolution? If Downing Street, or the Cabinet, or Whitehall, could ride roughshod over the Scottish settlement, what could they do to a far less devolved Wales? In what circumstances would they grab back the powers so hard fought, and so grudgingly given?

The London media was up and away with the leaked letters. An air of self-satisfied triumphalism became apparent as it attempted to drag Lord Mandelson, yet again, into the middle of this fiasco. Was the Prince of Darkness the architect once more? Had hands been shaken under tables on board the Corfu-moored yacht of Nat Rothschild, the First Secretary of State’s close buddy? And had this all gone on in the summer? Had Mandy been sorting out his BP pals when he should have been concentrating on running a desperately recession-wracked Britain?

But as all those flights of fancy came to nothing, and the story kept turning over the same Jack Straw connection, the less it made sense. Why should it make sense when the Scottish Executive had been holding all the cards? All the oil in the North Sea could not have levered a judicial system that had remained independent for hundreds of years, and certainly not one administrated by the SNP, whose close to non-existent working relationship with Labour stands in stark contrast to the One Wales agreement. No, any such foolishly-dispatched letters would have been gold dust for the nationalists, now just months away from fighting the weakest Labour government in a generation on the hustings.

Even the ponderous Brown administration, only swift when shooting itself in the foot (if it misses the head), moved quickly to release papers that told us – well, what? That Gordon Brown and David Miliband shared the Scottish Executive’s view that the Libyan bomber should not die in prison. No evidence of coercion, no smoking gun.

Perhaps the Government had got the result it wanted, but it didn’t have its hands on the levers. And that is the definition of abuse of power. Kenny MacAskill may have made the decision Downing Street was after, but he did so for different reasons. And that is the definition of a non-story.

It was still being run up the flagpole come Tuesday evening. A ludicrous piece that appeared among the al-Megrahi coverage on the BBC website, penned by one of its politicos, tried to decipher the meaning of this supposedly code-riven correspondence, complete with tart findings such as: “make of that what you will”. It had disappeared come evening time.

The opposition was left flailing. Cameron’s accusations of “double dealing” on the part of the Prime Minster rang hollow. He attacked Brown for having told our American allies that he concurred with their wishes while confiding in our new Libyan friends that matters would be settled in their favour. Nick Clegg was more circumspect, asking whether the whole affair was “cock-up or conspiracy”, before making an unconvincing case for conspiracy. His predecessor, Sir Menzies Campbell was more on the ball: “The idea that Kenny MacAskill would have responded willingly to any kind of suggestion from London, frankly, in my view, never was a starter, although it has had some support because of the speculation really which the government has allowed to run, not least because of the failure of the Prime Minister to make any public statement about these matters.”

Alex Salmond’s hope that “some of the dafter conspiracy theories” had now been laid to rest was followed with some unlikely support, from Iain Gray, the Scottish Labour leader: “This was a decision for Scottish ministers. They made it. I’ve made clear I think it was the wrong decision and if it had been up to me Megrahi would not have gone back to Libya. But I do believe that Scottish ministers made the decision themselves.” No doubt, the media in the English capital would have rejoined: “Well, he would say that, wouldn’t he?”

That this whole affair has been boiled down to an argument over Gordon Brown’s conduct speaks volumes about what British political reporting has become reduced to. Few throughout this have commented on the exemplary and transparent way in which Scottish ministers have conducted themselves throughout this extremely sensitive and important international affair.

It is not easy to go against the Americans: churlishly, one could make a comparison in Blair’s dealings with the Bush administration. But it is harder still to act on principle, particularly when 11 of your countrymen were killed in such appalling circumstances. The decision has sparked real – and, for the most part, amicable – debate in this country, in the pubs and on the sofa at home. Should we have left this killer to rot, and to Hell with what the Libyans – whose conduct over the past three decades leaves a lot to be desired – had wanted? Or should we prove that we are better than this monster, that we can show compassion, even to those sin so terribly against us? This debate is healthy for the nation, as it allows us all to examine our own values, and perhaps give a little light as to how much they changed – along with the rest of the world – following the al-Qaeda 9-11 attacks, whose eighth anniversary is marked next Friday.

Here in Wales, we can all breathe a little easier. There was no test of devolution from Whitehall. However, the test that came, and which may be subsequently seen in hindsight as devolution’s stiffest challenge yet, proved that the system works, at least north of the Border. It shows that a devolved administration can make mature and considered decisions of international importance, and it should serve as a further spur to those who believe we should devolve yet further. If it proves anything, it is the suspected ignorance that is abroad among London’s reporting community of matters beyond the hard shoulder of the M25. But if Scotland – and Wales – continues to take its affairs into its own hands, why should we care?