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More of a habit there: Irish nuns voting in in the 2007 General Election

AMID CONFIDENT predictions of a calmer and more progressive tenure, Sweden yesterday assumed the rolling six-month Presidency of the EU. This, it must be noted, is more to do with the reportedly chaotic and ill-prepared Czech Presidency that preceded it than with any Scandinavian stereotypes. Bulgaria, famously depicted as a toilet in the Czech commissioned Entropa frieze, may have had the most visible cause for complaint, but they were not alone in lamenting a presidency apparently devoid of a clear agenda, and convulsed by the mid-term collapse of its government.

But if the first half of 2009 has been trying, advocates of the European project harbour great hopes for the remainder of the year. The prospect of the revival of the once-presumed dead Treaty of Lisbon is the main factor behind such optimism. To recall, this is the treaty regarded by many as the failed European Constitution by other means, and which the impudent Irish appeared to single-handedly doom last year when they voted it down by a narrow margin. To Euro-enthusiasts and Euro-pragmatists alike, however, Lisbon is a long overdue and measured series of reforms for an EU groaning and gummed up by enlargement.

To the disgust of Eurosceptics everywhere it has taken the Irish government less than six months to conclude that, on balance, it was not minded to accept the previous verdict of its people. Consequently, and rather like indulgent parents struggling to coax their children into a more developed understanding, it has invited them to reflect again on whether they want to make the Union fit for 27 Members.

The vote will take place in October, and already the mood seems different. With the knowledge of having held up the European project once, Ireland seems more seized of the consequences of protesting via a referendum ballot box. Conventional wisdom suggests that the grievous turn for the worse suffered by the Irish economy since last August might induce an even greater desire to punish what is now an apparently terminally unpopular administration (earlier this year, and for the first time in Irish history, the Labour Party overtook the governing Fianna Fáil in the polls). Yet the reverse appears to be true; like the run-up to the first referendum, the “yes” campaign is in front in the polls. This time, however, it is consistently scoring about 50%. What’s more a significant chunk of voters – over a third – say they will vote “yes” this time so as “not to embarrass Ireland”.

So what does this willingness to immediately re-run a referendum where the “wrong” result was notched up mean for Wales? Here, the political calculations around when to hold a plebiscite on enhanced powers for the Assembly appear finely poised. The Chair of the All-Wales Convention, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, continues to dispense Delphic wisdom both on the public’s understanding of the existing settlement, and their capacity to make an informed choice about the future. If he has a settled view on whether and when the referendum should take place, he is keeping his own counsel. Labour and Plaid, meanwhile, continue to make maximum use of the breathing space afforded by the Convention, and have yet to be drawn even on the wisdom of establishing a “yes” campaign. Everywhere, those looking for more powers seem intent on proceeding with utmost caution, perhaps guided by the belief that this is a one-shot deal. But perhaps the lesson from Ireland is that they should not waste time and money optimising the climate of opinion and just go for it, safe in the knowledge that anything other than a resounding “no” could leave alive the prospect for a second vote in short order? In Ireland the vote last year was 53% to 46%. It is naive to believe that such a result in Wales would kill the push for more devolution.

Perhaps so, but it would be dangerous to infer from the Irish experience that very serious damage would not be done to the cause of Welsh autonomy by even a narrow rejection. First, the Irish government can claim to have won significant concessions from the EU upon which to base a re-tabling of the question. The last referendum was dominated by fears Irish neutrality and her ability to set her own abortion and euthanasia laws would be compromised, and that powers over taxation would pass to Brussels. Many voters were also less than impressed that Ireland stood to lose its Commissioner as a result of Lisbon’s requirement to slim down membership of the co-executive. Guarantees on the former issues have all now been granted (with ease in many cases, since the concerns were largely bogus to begin with) and the issue of the size of the Commission has, to use an Irish phrase, had the long finger put on it, and will be resolved at some point in the future.

To make a third referendum in Wales sellable, the terms of the vote would have to be similarly altered. But unlike in Ireland’s case, there would be no easily granted guarantees on phantom anxieties. The factors that might make people vote “no” in Wales, would likely be more grounded in the principle of devolving more power. So the basis for a new vote would likely be on a watered down version of what is promised in the One Wales agreement. The chances of gaining political consensus on that would be remote indeed. Second, the pressure on Ireland for a swift re-vote was immense, with most other EU member states having already ratified without the inconvenience of having to put it to a referendum. In Wales, the wrangling over how to re-pose the question could go on for years, and without major external impetus, they very well might.

The prospect of even a narrow defeat will therefore consign Wales to years of further protracted compromise and debate about its devolution settlement, continuing and intensifying the uncertainty of the past few years. Rhodri Morgan and Ieuan Wyn Jones are right to be cautious in naming the date; unlike the Irish, there will be no immediately referendum re-run in Wales – whatever the result.